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NOTE
Pro-whistleblower Reform in the
Post-Garcetti Era
Julian W. Kleinbrodt*
Whistleblowers who expose government ineptitude, inefficiency, and corruption are valuable assets to a well-functioning democracy. Until recently, the
Connick–Pickering test governed public employee speech law; it gave First
Amendment protection to government employees who spoke on matters of
public concern—such as whistleblowers—so long as the government’s administrative concerns did not outweigh the employees’ free speech interests. The
Supreme Court significantly curtailed the protection of such speech in its recent case, Garcetti v. Ceballos. This case created a categorical threshold requirement that afforded no protection to speech made as an employee rather
than as a citizen. Garcetti’s problematic rule has forced courts to adopt odd
exceptions; it has created perverse incentives and sits uncomfortably within
established First Amendment doctrine. This Note encourages a move away
from Garcetti by advocating for a tripartite balancing framework, whereby
speech is sorted according to its importance rather than the speaker’s role. In
the case of whistleblowers, this system would help ensure that the government
can only restrict speech by government employees exposing public wrongdoing
under extraordinary circumstances. This framework is more compatible with
the rest of First Amendment doctrine and ensures the protection of speech that
is most valuable to society.
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Introduction
In the modern administrative state, millions of citizens call the government “boss.”1 As such, the government assumes a dual role—employer and
sovereign.2 The practicalities of government employment vest the government-employer with far broader powers than those usually possessed by the
government-sovereign.3 Defining the scope of these extended powers is a
difficult, ongoing task, particularly within the realm of the First
Amendment.4
The Framers placed great weight on protecting freedom of speech.
James Madison considered the First Amendment “the most valuable amendment [o]n the whole list.”5 This elevated praise recognizes its centrality in
protecting the viability and vitality of democratic self-governance.6 Accordingly, the First Amendment protects a symbiosis: as part of the polity, citizens seek to contribute important ideas to the public discourse, and, as a
society, the community has a strong interest in receiving these ideas.7 Yet the
1. See U.S. Census Bureau, 2011 Public Employment and Payroll Data: State Governments, www2.census.gov/govs/apes/11stus.txt (last visited Mar. 31, 2013) (documenting over
four million state government employees); U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., Historical Federal
Workforce Tables: Total Government Employment Since 1962, http://www.opm.gov/feddata/
historicaltables/totalgovernmentsince1962.asp (last visited Mar. 31, 2013) (revealing that the
federal government has employed at least four million employees every year since 1962).
2. See, e.g., Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671–72 (1994).
3. E.g., id. For a general critique of the assumption underlying this assertion, see Randy
J. Kozel, Free Speech and Parity: A Theory of Public Employee Rights, 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
1985 (2012) (arguing that the government-employer should not have greater powers to control
its employees’ speech than the government-sovereign typically has over its citizenry).
4. Cf. Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1765, 1765 (2004) (“The history of the
First Amendment is the history of its boundaries.”).
5. 1 Annals of Cong. 784 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Mr. Tucker);
see also id. at 451 (statement of Mr. Madison) (“The people shall not be deprived or abridged
of their right to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the press, as
one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable.”); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486
(1960) (asserting that the right to free speech “lies at the foundation of a free society”).
6. E.g., John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 32–72 (AUK Publishers, 2011) (1859); see also
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“Those who won
our independence . . . believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are
means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech
and assembly discussion would be futile; . . . that public discussion is a political duty; and that
this should be a fundamental principle of American government.”), overruled by Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
7. See San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004).
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First Amendment’s concerns sometimes conflict with the government’s interest in operating an efficient workplace.8 The government must avoid
workplace disruption, promote employee morale, and discipline those who
undermine the integrity of the workplace and agency.9 The history of public
employee speech law, then, is one of an uneasy and constantly shifting relationship between protecting the employee’s speech and the government-employer’s administrative concerns.
There is no single definition of a whistleblower, and it takes on different
contours in different contexts.10 However, it appears that the term enjoys an
expansive definition in public employee speech law, where it is “defined in
the classic sense of exposing an official’s fault to a third party or to the
public.”11 That is, a whistleblower is a public employee who, after learning of
governmental misfeasance or nonfeasance, discloses this knowledge internally—through formal or informal channels—or publicly. This Note adopts
this denotation.
Whistleblower speech is critically important because it helps ensure a
well-functioning democracy.12 Government officials are responsible to, and
representative of, the public. When they misappropriate resources or engage
in misconduct, they undercut the public interest. But such misdoings must
be known for them to be punished and corrected. Since “[g]overnment employees are often in the best position to know what ails the agencies for
8. Marni M. Zack, Note, Public Employee Free Speech: The Policy Reasons for Rejecting a
Per Se Rule Precluding Speech Rights, 46 B.C. L. Rev. 893, 894–95 (2005).
9. David L. Hudson Jr., First Amendment Center, Balancing Act: Public Employees and Free Speech 3 (2002), available at http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/
madison/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/FirstReport.PublicEmployees.pdf.
10. Definitions differ both on what kinds of conduct whistleblowers expose and on
whether they require that the employees disclose the information to an official organization.
Compare Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009) (defining a whistleblower as “[a]n employee who reports employer wrongdoing to a governmental or law-enforcement agency”),
and 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (Supp. IV 2010) (“The term ‘whistleblower’ means any individual
who provides . . . information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission . . . .”), with Walton v. Dep’t of Agric., 230 F.3d 1383, at *3 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (per curiam)
(“ ‘Whistleblowing’ is defined as the disclosure of information by an employee or applicant
that the individual reasonably believes evidences a violation of law, rule, or regulation, gross
mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or substantial and specific danger to
public health or safety.”), and Joan Corbo, Note, Kraus v. New Rochelle Hosp. Medical Ctr.:
Are Whistleblowers Finally Getting the Protection They Need?, 12 Hofstra Lab. L.J. 141, 141
(1994) (“[A] whistleblower is defined as someone ‘who, believing that the public interest overrides the interest of the organization he serves, publicly “blows the whistle” if the organization
is involved in corrupt, illegal, fraudulent, or harmful activity.’ ” (quoting Lois A. Lofgren,
Comment, Whistleblower Protection: Should Legislatures and the Courts Provide a Shelter to
Public and Private Sector Employees Who Disclose the Wrongdoings of Employers?, 38 San Diego
L. Rev. 316, 316 (1993))).
11.

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 440 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting).

12. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (“[S]peech concerning public affairs
is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.” (alteration in original)
(quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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which they work,”13 society disproportionately relies on them to ensure
quality in government.14 Nonetheless, the specter of termination threatens to
suppress this type of speech and deprive the public of information that is
critical to a well-organized democracy.15 It also threatens to undermine public confidence in the government’s integrity.16
Originally, government employees had no special First Amendment
protections.17 But beginning in 1968, the Supreme Court charted a new direction for public employee speech law. In two landmark decisions, the
Court enunciated a new balancing regime—the Connick–Pickering test—
which balances the interests of the public employee, as a citizen commenting
on matters of public concern, against the interests of the State, as an employer, in promoting efficiency in public service.18
The Connick–Pickering formulation recognizes that government employees are valuable assets to public discourse19 and that the threat of termination poses a significant risk of chilling speech.20 Since the First
Amendment is a testament to a “profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide open,”21 the Court concluded that those interests should only be
13. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994) (plurality opinion); see also Diane
Norcross, Comment, Separating the Employee from the Citizen: The Social Science Implications
of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 40 U. Balt. L. Rev. 543, 571 (2011) (“[P]ublic employees, particularly
whistleblowers . . . are the best suited, in behavior as much as in position, to pursue the
government’s interests of office morale and efficiency.”).
14. See Press Release, Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Supreme Court to Public
Employees: ‘Your Conscience or Your Job’ (May 30, 2006), http://www.afscme.org/news/pressroom/press-releases/2006/supreme-court-to-public-employeesyour-conscience-or-your-job
(“If we are serious as a society about achieving accountability and openness in government, we
must hold public officials responsible for their actions. That means we ought to protect rankand-file public employees who are courageous enough to risk their own careers to speak out
about possible violations of the law or ethical breaches.”).
15. See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (per curiam); Waters, 511 U.S.
at 674 (“[P]ublic debate may gain much from [government employees’] informed opinions.”).
16. Cf. H.R. 67, 111th Cong. § 101(1) (2009) (finding that government entities that
violate “whistleblower protection laws . . . undermine the confidence of the American people
in the Government”).
17. As Justice Holmes explained in 1892, “There are few employments for hire in which
the servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional rights of free speech . . . . The servant
cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which are offered him.” McAuliffe
v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517–18 (Mass. 1892).
18. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150–52 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S.
563, 568 (1968).
19. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 433 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting).
20. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574; see also Howard Kline, Note and Comment, Garcetti v.
Ceballos: The Cost of Silencing Public Employees, 28 J.L. & Com. 75, 77 (2009) (“Garcetti has
deterred millions of public employees from speaking out on government waste, fraud and
corruption.”).
21. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); see also Connick, 461 U.S. at
145 (“The First Amendment was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.” (quoting Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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compromised when outweighed by countervailing governmental concerns.22
In 2006, however, the Court significantly changed the Connick–Pickering
framework in Garcetti v. Ceballos.23 There, the Court enunciated a new
threshold requirement: an employee’s speech must be made in his capacity
as a citizen, rather than as an employee speaking pursuant to his official
duties, in order to proceed to the Connick–Pickering framework.24 Therefore,
courts are directed to initially scrutinize whether the employee was speaking
pursuant to official duties. If so, the employee spoke in an official capacity—
not as a citizen—and is categorically denied First Amendment protection for
his statements.
This doctrinal shift was ill-advised. Over half a century ago, Justice
Frankfurter’s concurring opinion in Dennis v. United States persuasively argued that balancing inquiries are the only sufficient way to evaluate First
Amendment claims because absolute rules would be insufficiently flexible to
serve the Amendment’s policy rationale.25 In most areas of First Amendment
jurisprudence, Justice Frankfurter’s approach has generally carried the day,26
but his words of warning, unfortunately, have proved prescient in Garcetti’s
wake.
The theoretical concerns have manifested. Garcetti has produced general
confusion in the lower courts.27 It has the potential to generate anomalous
results.28 And, most saliently, its inflexibility has forced courts to plug
Garcetti’s doctrinal holes with exceptions.29 The recent circuit split between
the Second and D.C. Circuits highlights numerous problems regarding
Garcetti’s applicability.
22. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
23.

547 U.S. 410.

24. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
25.

341 U.S. 494, 524–25 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

26. See Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 767, 779 (2001)
(noting that many First Amendment decisions are “loaded with the rhetoric of balancing”).
27. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 22, Bowie v. Maddox, 132 S. Ct. 1636 (2012)
(No. 11-670), 2011 WL 5999532, at *22 (2011) (“In the five years since Garcetti, the courts of
appeals have used widely varying approaches to distinguish public employees’ speech as citizens from their speech pursuant to official duties.”); Thomas Keenan, Note, Circuit Court
Interpretations of Garcetti v. Ceballos and the Development of Public Employee Speech, 87 Notre Dame L. Rev. 841, 847–60 (2011) (cataloguing the various approaches utilized by circuit
courts in undertaking the scope of employment inquiry under Garcetti); Tyler Wiese, Note,
Seeing Through the Smoke: “Official Duties” in the Wake of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 25 ABA J. Lab.
& Emp. L. 509, 515–16 (2010) (“The federal appellate courts have struggled with giving meaning to the category of ‘official duties.’ A survey of these courts reveals two general strains of
analysis . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
28. For example, Judge Flaum of the Seventh Circuit noted such a possibility: “We
recognize the oddity of a constitutional ruling in which speech said to one individual may be
protected under the First Amendment, while precisely the same speech said to another individual is not protected. . . . [Nevertheless,] Garcetti established just such a framework, and we
are obliged to apply it.” Morales v. Jones, 494 F.3d 590, 598 (7th Cir. 2007).
29. See Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 240–42 (2d Cir. 2011) (creating a “civilian analogue” exception to Garcetti’s categorical rule), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1634 (2012).

116

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 112:111

This Note argues that Garcetti went too far in creating an inflexible
threshold requirement for First Amendment protection of public employee
speech. Instead, a tiered balancing test is a more appropriate approach for
addressing the issue of public employee speech while remaining faithful to
traditional First Amendment concerns. Part I criticizes Garcetti’s categorical
rule because it fails to protect important whistleblowing, creates perverse
incentives, and is doctrinally inconsistent. Part II offers a new analytical
framework for analyzing public employee speech law that addresses the concerns of Garcetti without sacrificing the ultimate backstop protecting the
First Amendment rights of public employees. Specifically, Part II proposes a
three-tiered balancing scheme, which gives speech varying levels of protection based on its importance to the public.
I. Garcetti and First Amendment Fundamentals
Garcetti fundamentally changed the established public speech law analysis by inserting a threshold inquiry into what had primarily been a fluid
balancing framework. Commentators have thoroughly criticized the decision.30 Nonetheless, its problematic implications are only starting to come to
fruition in lower courts.
Section I.A discusses the relevant history and legal standards deployed
in cases involving public employee speech. Section I.B then criticizes the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Garcetti. This Section uses the Second
and D.C. Circuits’ conflicting decisions in Jackler v. Byrne31 and Bowie v.
Maddox32 as vehicles for exposing Garcetti’s troubling implications. Section
I.C discusses perverse incentives stemming from Garcetti. Finally, Section
I.D argues that Garcetti took a misguided doctrinal step that makes public
employee speech an anomaly within First Amendment jurisprudence. In
sum, the decision’s flaws call for a post-Garcetti reconceptualization of the
public speech framework.
A. The Ongoing Debate over Public Employee Speech Law
Public employee speech law has fully passed through three phases.33 In
the first phase, which lasted until the 1950s, the Supreme Court gave no
protection to government employees on the theory that public employment
is a privilege, not a right.34 In the second phase, the Court tempered its
30. E.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Worst Supreme Court Case Ever? Identifying, Assessing,
and Exploring Low Moments of the High Court, 12 Nev. L.J. 516, 523 (2012) (selecting Garcetti
as the worst Supreme Court decision in history). But see Kermit Roosevelt III, Not as Bad as
You Think: Why Garcetti v. Ceballos Makes Sense, 14 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 631, 652–54 (2012).
31. Jackler, 658 F.3d 225.
32. 642 F.3d 1122 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1636 (2012).
33. Lara Geer Farley, Comment, A Matter of Public Concern: “Official Duties” of Employment Gag Public Employee Free Speech Rights, 46 Washburn L.J. 603, 609 (2007); Cynthia
K.Y. Lee, Comment, Freedom of Speech in the Public Workplace: A Comment on the Public
Concern Requirement, 76 Calif. L. Rev. 1109, 1112 (1988).
34. See McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517–18 (Mass. 1892).
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earlier approach and recognized that public employees could not have their
speech rights curtailed for “patently arbitrary or discriminatory” purposes.35
It was not until the third phase that the Court began to seriously protect
public employees’ free speech rights.36 The Pickering v. Board of Education
Court found that Marvin Pickering, a schoolteacher who wrote a letter to his
local newspaper condemning the local school board’s financial activities,
had a free speech interest that outweighed the government’s interest in efficiency.37 The government argued that Pickering’s letter “unjustifiably impugned the [school board’s] ‘motives, honesty, integrity, truthfulness,
responsibility and competence,’ ” which in turn adversely affected the
board’s professional reputation, disrupted faculty discipline, and sowed controversy and dissent among the district’s employees.38 The Court found that
these concerns were overblown and posited that Pickering’s letter did little
to impede or interfere with the operations of the district’s schools.39 The
Court then concluded that the public’s interest in unhampered discussion
on matters of public importance outweighed the government’s concerns.40
In doing so, it suggested a framework where the public employee’s right to
free speech must be balanced against the government’s legitimate concerns
as an employer.41 Only if the government’s concerns outweighed the employee’s interests could the government discipline the employee for his
speech.
After Pickering, the government could generally limit an employee’s
speech for administrative reasons,42 but whistleblowing was largely protected. Statements that impaired discipline or harmony among coworkers,
compromised working relationships, impeded the performance of the
speaker’s job duties, or interfered with the organization’s regular operations
were entitled to less protection.43 The countervailing concerns were “the employee’s interests in communicating, and the interests of the community in
receiving, information ‘on matters of public importance.’ ”44 Specifically,
35.

Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952).

36. See Wiese, supra note 27, at 511 (“In Pickering, the Supreme Court built a true
foundation of First Amendment protections for public employees.”).
37.

391 U.S. 563, 568–73 (1968).

38. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 566–67.
39. Id. at 572–73.
40. See id. at 573–74.
41. Id. at 568–73.
42. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Ramirez, 360 F.3d 692, 697–98 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that the
government has an “interest as an employer in providing effective and efficient services” to the
public).
43. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987) (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at
570–73).
44.
at 573).

O’Connor v. Steeves, 994 F.2d 905, 915 (1st Cir. 1993) (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S.
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courts were unsympathetic to employees who made statements out of vindictive or retributive interests,45 but courts suggested that employees’ altruistic statements that were made more out of civic obligation than personal
interest had greater First Amendment value.46 Speech that exposed misconduct or abuse by public officials “occup[ied] ‘the highest rung in the hierarchy of First Amendment values’ ” and was thus entitled to the most
protection.47
Fifteen years later, in Connick v. Myers, the Supreme Court clarified the
decision in Pickering and held that a case only advanced to the balancing
analysis if the employee spoke on a matter of public concern.48 The result
was a four-step test. A court confronted with a public employee speech
claim would ask whether (1) the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of
public concern, (2) the individual’s speech interest outweighed the government’s interest in efficient administration, (3) the government responded
with a retaliatory employment action, and (4) the government would not
have taken the same action if the speech had not occurred.49
The courts struck this balance for decades under Connick and Pickering
and refused to adopt any framework that reached a conclusion before analyzing the speech’s content.50 This balancing test reflects the well-entrenched
notion that “the core value of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment . . . [is] ‘[t]he public interest in having free and unhindered debate on
matters of public importance.’ ”51 But the test also recognizes that this value
must be counterbalanced against the government’s responsibility as an employer and provider of public services, and, consequently, the government’s
need to deliver those services effectively and efficiently.52 Under this system,
public employees enjoyed their most robust speech rights to date.
What might be coined the “fourth era” of public employee speech law
began with Garcetti, where the Court scaled back such protection by narrowing the applicability of the Connick–Pickering test. Richard Ceballos was
45. See, e.g., Lighton v. Univ. of Utah, 209 F.3d 1213, 1225 (10th Cir. 2000); Versarge v.
Township of Clinton, 984 F.2d 1359, 1366 (3d Cir. 1993).
46. See, e.g., O’Connor, 994 F.2d at 915–16.
47. Id. (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983)); accord Lindsey v. City of
Orrick, 491 F.3d 892, 902 (8th Cir. 2007) (“[S]peech alleging illegal misconduct by public
officials occupies the highest rung of First Amendment hierarchy.” (quoting Hall v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 235 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Swinefold v. Snyder Cnty., Pa., 15 F.3d 1258, 1274 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Speech involving
government impropriety occupies the highest rung of First Amendment protection.”).
48.

461 U.S. 138, 140, 145–46 (1983).

49. Lybrook v. Members of Farmington Mun. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 232 F.3d 1334,
1338–39 (10th Cir. 2000).
50. See, e.g., Fairley v. Andrews, 430 F. Supp. 2d 786, 795 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (utilizing the
core Connick–Pickering framework on May 4, 2006—twenty-six days before the Garcetti
decision).
51. Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 783–84 (4th Cir. 2004) (third alteration in original) (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573–74 (1968)).
52.

Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
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a deputy district attorney in Los Angeles, California.53 Ceballos discovered
what he believed to be inaccuracies in an affidavit.54 Despite Ceballos’s vigorous internal opposition (both at meetings and in memoranda), the district
attorney proceeded with the prosecution, and Ceballos was called as a witness for the defense to testify against the government.55 He later brought
suit, claiming that his employer retaliated against him for his dissention and
testimony by reassigning and relocating him, as well as denying him a promotion.56 The district court held that Ceballos was not entitled to First
Amendment protection because he had voiced his concerns as an employee
rather than as a citizen.57 The Ninth Circuit reversed based on Pickering.58
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision. In doing so, it
added a new element to the old standard: the Garcetti Court held that the
First Amendment did not protect employees who spoke within the scope of
their official duties (often including comments made internally).59 Any
claims predicated on speech pursuant to an employee’s official duties would
therefore not be analyzed under the Connick–Pickering analysis.60 The government-employer can now restrict employee speech in these contexts without any limit.
One of the most important changes that Garcetti made was shifting the
initial analytical locus from the content of the speech to the role of the
speaker.61 Previously, Connick required a content-driven inquiry, as it forced
a court to determine whether the employee’s speech touched on a matter of
public concern.62 In contrast, Garcetti’s threshold requirement is driven by
the role of the individual.63 By demanding an inquiry into whether an employee’s speech was made pursuant to official duties, Garcetti identifies a
large swath of speech where the government’s interest in efficiency automatically outweighs the value of employee speech,64 without regard to content—
a result that was explicitly avoided by the Pickering era courts.65 The ramifications, as discussed in the following Sections, are unfortunate.
53. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 413 (2006).
54. Id. at 413–14.
55. Id. at 414–15.
56. Id. at 415.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See id. at 424; id. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
60. See id. at 421 (majority opinion).
61. Williams v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 692 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam)
(“Under Garcetti, we must shift our focus from the content of the speech to the role the
speaker occupied . . . .”).
62. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983).
63. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
64. See id.
65. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569 (1968) (declining to “lay down a general standard” as infeasible and inappropriate); see also Elizabeth M. Ellis, Note, Garcetti v.
Ceballos: Public Employees Left to Decide “Your Conscience or Your Job”, 41 Ind. L. Rev. 187,
209 (2008) (positing that the Pickering Court “acknowledged that First Amendment claims are
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B. Garcetti’s Shortcomings
The “fourth era” of public employee speech law has scaled back protections for public employees, which is particularly troublesome in the
whistleblowing context. To remedy this situation, some courts have resorted
to crafting exceptions. But such exceptions only serve to undermine the categorical rule and exacerbate Garcetti’s problematic outcomes. A current split
between the D.C. and Second Circuits perfectly illustrates these two concerns. Section I.B.1 uses the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Bowie v. Maddox to
illuminate the difficulties whistleblowers face in Garcetti’s wake. Section
I.B.2 considers the Second Circuit’s decision in Jackler v. Byrne, which, on
similar facts, diverged from Bowie, but argues that this decision is also
flawed.
1. An Inescapable Predicament for Whistleblowers
Garcetti’s categorical rule leaves certain whistleblowing outside the
scope of the First Amendment’s protections. The exclusion of such actions is
particularly disconcerting since “a core concern of the [F]irst [A]mendment
is the protection of the ‘whistle-blower’ attempting to expose government
corruption.”66
The D.C. Circuit’s decision in Bowie v. Maddox underscores Garcetti’s
problematic implications for whistleblowers. David M. Bowie67 worked in
the District of Columbia’s Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”).68 Allegedly due to FBI Assistant Director Jimmy C. Carter’s69 instructions, the OIG
terminated Emanuel Johnson, Bowie’s long-time colleague.70 In the ensuing
employment discrimination suit, Bowie, citing “misstatements of facts,” refused to sign an affidavit in support of the OIG’s defense.71 Soon after,
Bowie’s performance reviews began to deteriorate (previously, the reviews
inherently fact sensitive and are thus better suited to a balancing of the interests . . . [rather
than] a per se rule”).
66. Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, 230 F.3d 1275, 1292 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting
Bryson v. City of Waycross, 888 F.2d 1562, 1566 (11th Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Keyser v. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., 265 F.3d 741, 748 (9th Cir.
2001) (noting that “the public’s interest in learning about illegal conduct by public officials” is
one matter “at the core of First Amendment protection”); Johnson v. Multnomah Cnty., Or.,
48 F.3d 420, 425 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The guarantees of the First Amendment ‘share a common
core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of
government.’ Therefore, we have stated that the misuse of public funds, wastefulness, and
inefficiency in managing and operating government entities are matters of inherent public
concern.” (citation omitted) (quoting McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir.
1983))).
67. Not to be confused with the British rock musician David R. Bowie.
68. Bowie v. Maddox, 642 F.3d 1122, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1636
(2012).
69. Not to be confused with former president of the United States Jimmy E. Carter, Jr.
70. Bowie, 642 F.3d at 1126.
71. Id. at 1127 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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had been “top-notch”), he was removed from a high-profile assignment, and
he was passed over for a promotion.72 Within two years, Bowie was terminated.73 He filed suit in April 2003, but the district court granted summary
judgment against his First Amendment claim because it found that his
speech was not protected under Garcetti.74
The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal.75 The court
found that Bowie’s refusal to sign the letter was within the scope of his
employment: OIG attorneys gave the affidavit to Bowie, Bowie revised it on
a timetable approved by the general counsel, and it stated on the signature
block that he was “Assistant Inspector General for Investigations.”76 The appellate panel agreed with the district court’s application of Garcetti.77
The plain repercussions of this decision are troubling. Bowie makes clear
that the First Amendment will not protect a government agent who refuses
to file a false writing when ordered to do so by his superior. This puts the
employee between the proverbial rock and a hard place: the employee can
remain silent, thereby failing to comply with often-applicable legal, professional, and ethical duties, or risk backlash from the employer.78 As Justice
Stevens lamented in his Garcetti dissent, this is a situation that employees
often face.79 Garcetti’s categorical rule, which excludes a large amount of
speech made by government employees from First Amendment protection,
will cause many public employees to either cover up potential government
misconduct or face unprotected retaliatory employment action.80
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1127–28.
75. See id. at 1134.
76. Id. at 1133–34 (internal quotation marks omitted).
77. Id.
78. Early commentators counseled against an expansive construction of Garcetti to
avoid this precise situation. See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 65, at 209–10. Furthermore, failure to
comply with these duties can produce significant consequences. Obviously, violation of legal
duties can carry civil or criminal penalties. But professional and ethical canons can also carry
potent ramifications. See, e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 2220 (West 2012 & Supp. 2013)
(vesting state medical board with authority to discipline doctors who violate professional requirements); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6077 (West 2003) (providing for attorney discipline
by state bar for willful breach of rules of professional conduct).
79. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 n.* (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see
also Christine A. Wardell, Introduction, in Compliance Programs and the Corporate Sentencing Guidelines § 14:1 (Jeffrey M. Kaplan & Joseph E. Murphy eds., 2012) (“It is virtually impossible to develop reliable empirical evidence regarding the frequency with which
whistleblowers actually suffer retribution, but it can and does occur. Indeed, the popular perception is that retribution against whistleblowers is common.”).
80. This scenario has been described as placing public employees “on the horns of a
dilemma,” where the employees, no matter which course of action they select, are “gored” by
the results. The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Leading Cases, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 125, 279 (2006)
(quoting Brief of Ass’n of Deputy District Attorneys & California Prosecutors Ass’n as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondent at 2, Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (No. 04-473), 2005 WL
1767121, at *2) (internal quotation marks omitted).

122

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 112:111

The doctrine harms the public as well. As previously noted, the public
has a strong interest in maintaining a robust exchange of ideas free from
government interference.81 The First Amendment’s protections become
more salient when they implicate particularly valuable and sensitive speech.
This includes speech revealing potential unlawful conduct, corruption, discrimination, misconduct, wastefulness, inefficiency, or wrongdoing by government agencies or employees, which is inherently of public concern82—
the kind of speech at issue in Bowie.83 Bowie could have a chilling effect on
the speech of public employees who, if they are aware of the decision, decide
that they cannot afford to lose their jobs.84
Beyond actual harm done to individuals and society, Bowie promulgates
the wrong message: “The federal appeals court is literally saying that it is
more important that managers can control their employees than it is that
employees can be honest in official investigations.”85
Indeed, while the previous balancing standard would have allowed this
outcome in certain circumstances,86 Bowie proves that Garcetti categorically
mandates it. Implicit in this doctrinal shift, then, is the elevation of the
speaker’s role over any other countervailing considerations. This does not
just supplement the Pickering line of cases; it obliterates it.87 This unfairly
places public employees in an unwinnable situation, damages the public
marketplace of ideas, and improperly prioritizes First Amendment policy
objectives.
2. Unmanageable Exceptions
Although confronted with similar facts, the Second Circuit avoided
Bowie’s harsh results in Jackler v. Byrne.88 Jason Jackler was a police officer in
81. See, e.g., N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. López Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208 (2008).
82. See, e.g., Alpha Energy Savers, Inc. v. Hansen, 381 F.3d 917, 925–26 (9th Cir. 2004).
83. Bowie v. Maddox, 642 F.3d 1122, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1636
(2012).
84. The obvious counterargument is that Bowie actually incentivizes employees to publicly air their grievances, so a fear of a chilling effect is unwarranted or speculative. However,
this scenario presents its own problems. See infra Section I.C.
85. Richard Renner, Supreme Court Ducks Conflict on Garcetti, Whistleblower Protection Blog (Feb. 27, 2012), http://www.whistleblowersblog.org/2012/02/articles/
whistleblowers-government-empl/supreme-court-ducks-conflict-on-garcetti/.
86. E.g., Barry v. Luzerne Cnty., 447 F. Supp. 2d 438, 449 (M.D. Pa. 2006) (concluding
that the government’s interest in efficient investigation into a prison escape outweighed an
individual’s First Amendment rights); see also Hoover v. Morales, 164 F.3d 221, 226 (5th Cir.
1998) (“We may safely assume that there will be occasions when the State’s interest in efficient
delivery of public services will be [sufficiently] hindered by a state employee . . . [to justify]
curtail[ing] that employee’s speech.”).
87. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 427 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Our
silence as to whether or not her speech was made pursuant to her job duties demonstrates that
the point was immaterial. That is equally true today, for it is senseless to let constitutional
protection for exactly the same words hinge on whether they fall within a job description.”).
88. 658 F.3d 225 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1634 (2012).
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Middletown, New York, who observed a fellow officer punch a suspect who
had been detained in a police car.89 In response to the ensuing excessive
force complaint, Jackler filed a one-page report corroborating the allegations
contained in the civilian complaint.90 Police supervisors then met with
Jackler and tried to coerce him into withdrawing his report and refiling a
new one containing “false, incomplete[,] and misleading information” to
“conceal the illegal actions and misconduct” of the arresting officer.91 Jackler
refused.92 In retaliation, the Board of Police Commissioners dismissed
Jackler.93
Like Richard Ceballos and David Bowie before him, Jackler faced the
seemingly insurmountable hurdle of having to argue that his refusal to file a
false report (at the direction of his superior officer) about events that took
place on duty and pursuant to official policy was outside the scope of his
official obligations.94 Somewhat surprisingly, the Second Circuit sided with
Jackler.95
The Second Circuit reached this decision by elevating the analytical import of a so-called “civilian analogue.” The Second Circuit first enunciated
the legal force of the civilian analogue in Weintraub v. Board of Education,
where the court found that a teacher’s complaint, filed with the union, was
made pursuant to his employment duties since, in part, there was “no relevant citizen analogue” to that channel of speech.96 That is to say, a union
grievance was a unique process that existed only due to the teacher’s publicemployee status; therefore, there was no relevant civilian analogue.97
In essence, Weintraub’s civilian-analogue inquiry directed a court to examine the speech in question and determine whether a private citizen could
have acted in the same way. An ordinary private citizen could not file a
grievance with the union for public school teachers, but, as the Jackler court
pointed out, a private individual would be barred by law from retracting a
truthful statement and replacing it with a false one in a police
investigation.98
Until Jackler, however, a lack of civilian analogue had only been used to
buttress the conclusion that an employee spoke within the scope of his employment; the presence of a civilian analogue had never justified the position
that the employee was automatically speaking as a citizen.99 Thus, Jackler
89. Jackler, 658 F.3d at 230–31.
90. Id. at 231.
91. Id. at 231–32 (internal quotation marks omitted).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See id. at 232.
95. Id. at 244–45.
96. 593 F.3d 196, 198–99, 203–04 (2d Cir. 2010).
97. See Weintraub, 593 F.3d at 204.
98. Jackler, 658 F.3d at 240.
99. See Caroline A. Flynn, Note, Policeman, Citizen, or Both? A Civilian Analogue Exception to Garcetti v. Ceballos, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 759, 779 (2013).
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broke new ground when it concluded that the speech at issue was not undertaken pursuant to a public employee’s official duties if it had a “civilian
analogue.”
As an initial matter, Jackler’s civilian analogue exception does not flow
from Garcetti.100 Garcetti’s passing reference to civilian analogues does not
lead to the conclusion that any speech containing such an analogue is protected by the First Amendment; the critical inquiry is whether the speech
“was performed ‘pursuant to . . . official duties.’ ”101 While Bowie problematically forces employees to confront an impossible decision, it is more faithful
to the rule announced in Garcetti.
Furthermore, Jackler’s exception is unmanageable in its own right.102 Put
bluntly, the civilian-analogue exception “is about as useful as a mosquito net
made of chicken wire.”103 The D.C. Circuit found the standard particularly
susceptible to a line-drawing problem: “All official speech, viewed at a sufficient level of abstraction, has a civilian analogue.”104 As a result, the Second
Circuit’s approach has the potential to seriously undermine Garcetti’s categorical nature. Since all speech, aptly construed, could have a civilian analogue, any statement could be subject to the exception endorsed in Jackler.105
The Second Circuit’s manufactured exception underscores a deeper,
more critical failing of Garcetti. Garcetti forces employees to make impossible decisions.106 Courts are then inclined to create “dubious interpretation[s]
of Garcetti” to escape these problematic outcomes.107 These exceptions are
undesirable in their own right. Unconditional exceptions, such as the one
employed in Jackler, realize Justice Frankfurter’s warning that “[a]bsolute
100. Bowie v. Maddox, 653 F.3d 45, 47–48 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (order denying petition for
rehearing) (“The Second Circuit gets Garcetti backwards.”); Chatel v. Carney, No. 10-cv-576PB, 2012 WL 1439051, at *6 n.6 (D.N.H. Apr. 26, 2012) (“Even if Jackler were analogous to
this case, it is not binding precedent on this court and I would decline to follow it because it is
unpersuasive. In addition, other courts have cast doubt on the Second Circuit’s analysis in
Jackler.”). Even commentators who advocate for the adoption of Jackler’s civilian analogue test
admit that it “does not follow from a strict interpretation of Garcetti.” Flynn, supra note 98, at
762.
101. Bowie, 653 F.3d at 48 (alteration in original) (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547
U.S. 410, 421 (2006)).
102.
778–87.

For a defense of Jackler’s civilian-analogue exception, see Flynn, supra note 98, at

103. Bowie, 653 F.3d at 48.
104. Id.
105. For instance, Garcetti, at the very least, is clear that a prosecutor’s internal protests
over the contents of an affidavit are within the scope of employment. But it would be possible
to construe a civilian analogue by noting the possibility of a private employee who felt similarly bound by ethical or professional duties to voice concerns about an office report. Thus, the
Bowie court implied that Jackler’s exception, while cabining itself semantically, imposed no
real limits on courts and could plausibly be read to exempt the situation that the Supreme
Court explicitly found to be within the scope of employment in Garcetti. See Bowie, 653 F.3d
at 48.
106. See supra note 80.
107. Bowie, 653 F.3d at 48.
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rules would inevitably lead to absolute exceptions, and such exceptions
would eventually corrode the rules.”108
The civilian-analogue exception may only be the first step in this process
of corroding Garcetti’s categorical rule. For example, the Second Circuit
failed to detail why speech with a civilian-analogue exception should be exempt but speech pursuant to a professional or ethical obligation should not.
Surely, there are instances where a professional code of conduct will bind a
government employee without a civilian analogue. In such a case, neither
Garcetti nor Jackler would provide a remedy for the employee, and the employee would remain unprotected. This omission creates an imbalance in
protection where those who take actions with civilian analogues are given
additional protection over those who remain faithful to professional and
ethical obligations without such analogues.109
In the alternative, courts could respond like the Second Circuit in Jackler
and create more exceptions. If courts were to fashion additional exceptions,
they would begin to hollow out Garcetti from within, undermining one of
the primary purposes of a categorical rule: to increase predictability and
consistency.110 A categorical rule riddled with amorphous exceptions, such
as a civilian analogue, quickly loses its ability to be consistently applied and,
as a product of exceptions continuing to spring up, also forfeits any semblance of predictability.111
The decisions reached in Bowie and Jackler underscore a number of
problems with Garcetti’s categorical rule.112 Even Bowie admitted that
Garcetti forces courts to take unsympathetic positions.113 Ironically, courts
find themselves in a situation similar to the employees at issue; both are
confronted with circumstances where each alternative is objectionable. Application of the rule under Bowie is unfair to the employee and deprives
108. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see
also David L. Faigman, Reconciling Individual Rights and Government Interests: Madisonian
Principles Versus Supreme Court Practice, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1521, 1536 (1992) (“[T]he categorical
method comes to admit exceptions . . . .”).
109. For example, it seems plausible that government prosecutors could be retaliated
against for making required Brady disclosures during a criminal prosecution. See Krystal LoPilato, Recent Case, Garcetti v. Ceballos: Public Employees Lose First Amendment Protection for
Speech Within Their Job Duties, 27 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 537, 544 (2006).
110. See Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Categorical Analysis in Antitrust Jurisprudence, 93 Iowa L. Rev. 1207, 1262 (2008).
111. Some have questioned whether Garcetti’s categorical rule—even free from exceptions—provides predictability. E.g., Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Public Employee Speech Rights
Fall Prey to an Emerging Doctrinal Formalism, 15 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 1173, 1194–98
(2007).
112. It should also be noted that because the Supreme Court has denied certiorari to
both Jackler and Bowie, Byrne v. Jackler, 132 S. Ct. 1634 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 658
F.3d 225 (2d Cir. 2011); Bowie v. Maddox, 132 S. Ct. 1636 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 642
F.3d 1122 (D.C. Cir. 2011), there is an additional problem of geographic nonuniformity, see
Renner, supra note 85.
113. See Bowie v. Maddox, 653 F.3d 45, 48 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (order denying petition for
rehearing).
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society of valuable information, but Jackler’s exception is only an ill-conceived stopgap. When either outcome is deeply problematic, the standard
itself is flawed.
C. Garcetti Also Creates Perverse Incentives
Jackler and Bowie expose deep flaws stemming from a disagreement regarding Garcetti’s “scope of employment” requirement. However, Garcetti’s
categorical rule also produces additional difficulties not implicated in those
cases. First, Garcetti encourages employees to voice their concerns publicly,
which undermines the Court’s efficiency rationale. Second, Garcetti enables
the public employer to use internal reporting requirements as a mechanism
for controlling or terminating potential whistleblowers.
One of Garcetti’s major deficiencies is that it incentivizes employees to
publicly voice their concerns before they utilize internal channels of communication. Both the majority and dissenters in Garcetti acknowledged this
point.114 After Garcetti, an employee will typically not be entitled to First
Amendment protection if he utilizes internal channels to voice his concerns.115 Nonetheless, employers set up internal channels of communication,
in large part, to allow employees to discover official misconduct and deal
with it efficiently without creating an unnecessary public uproar. Therefore,
it is paradoxical to incentivize employees to act outside of these mechanisms.
This only creates fodder for scandal rather than efficiently remedying
wrongdoing or incompetence. This significantly undermines the administrative efficiency of an organization—as resources will continually need to be
diverted to deal with additional issues, such as public relations—which was
one of the central justifications for Garcetti’s categorical rule.116

114. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006); id. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Additionally, other courts and commentators have discussed the problem extensively. E.g.,
Barclay v. Michalsky, 493 F. Supp. 2d 269, 276 n.4 (D. Conn. 2007); Jenny Mendelsohn, Note,
Calling the Boss or Calling the Press: A Comparison of British and American Responses to Internal
and External Whistleblowing, 8 Wash. U. Glob. Stud. L. Rev. 723, 729 (2009). Years before
Garcetti, the Ninth Circuit rejected as “absurd” a First Amendment regime that hinged its
applicability, at least in part, on the identity and size of the audience: “[I]n a good-faith
whistleblowing context, the breadth of one’s audience is irrelevant. It would be absurd to
extend First Amendment protection only to those whistleblowers who immediately appear on
the local news.” Hufford v. McEnaney, 249 F.3d 1142, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001).
115. E.g., Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 593 F.3d 196, 204–05 (2d Cir. 2010) (determining
that a teacher is not entitled to First Amendment protection when filing a union grievance
because that is a channel of communication uniquely available to public school teachers via an
agreement with their employer); see also Fergus v. City of N.Y., No. 11 Civ. 2419(WHP), 2011
WL 5007000, at *4 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2011) (holding that a doctor’s complaints to her
superior about an echocardiogram backlog were pursuant to her employment but then musing
that had she written a letter to the editor, “she would have a stronger case”); David L. Hudson
Jr., The Garcetti Effect, ABA J., Jan. 2008, at 16–17 (suggesting that public employees who go
public tend to survive Garcetti).
116. E.g., Kline, supra note 20, at 83–84.
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Garcetti also allows government employers to use the employees’ official
duties as a mechanism for suppressing speech. For example, many government employees are required to report misconduct.117 This imposes a catch22 for employees. If an employee complies with his official duty to report
misconduct, the First Amendment will not protect the statements included
in his report. Consequently, the employer can terminate him without repercussions or threaten to do so to suppress the allegations. In the alternative, if
the employee does not make the required reports, the employer has legitimate grounds to terminate him. Thus, to minimize liability and exposure,
public employers are incentivized to include reporting requirements within
the scope of an employee’s official duties, which can be wielded against the
employee regardless of whether he complies with the agency’s policy.
D. A Doctrinal Outlier in First Amendment Jurisprudence
Besides the practical implications discussed above, Garcetti also presents
a theoretical difficulty. Under the Connick–Pickering rule, the Court pursued
a generally ad hoc approach—aside from requiring that the speech touch on
a matter of public importance118—that has since been displaced by Garcetti’s
categorical approach.119 “Categorical balancing”—arriving at a general rule
for all cases by abstractly weighing the overarching policy concerns120—is
not a stranger to First Amendment law. Public employee speech law, however, is theoretically dissimilar to other kinds of speech subject to categorical
rules. Therefore, as a matter of doctrinal consistency, it should be analyzed
under a more holistic balancing regime.
A decision to adopt a categorical balancing regime is derivative of a distinct policy choice that the excluded speech has little to no First Amendment
value.121 This is reflected in the areas in which the Court has exercised
117. E.g., ARS Directive 461.5(9), Misconduct, Discipline, and Adverse Action
(U.S.D.A. 1993), available at http://www.afm.ars.usda.gov/ppweb/PDF/461-05.pdf; Internal
Revenue Serv., Internal Revenue Manual § 39.1.1.2.1(1) (2012), available at http://
www.irs.gov/irm/part39/irm_39-001-001.html.
118. See Sheldon H. Nahmod, Public Employee Speech, Categorical Balancing and
§ 1983: A Critique of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 42 U. Rich. L. Rev. 561, 566–67 (2008) (describing
the Garcetti dissenters as attempting to “retain the Pickering–Connick ad hoc balancing test”).
119. See id. at 569 (“In ruling that the job-required speech of public employees is not
protected from employer discipline by the First Amendment, the Court used what has evolved
into a conventional approach: categorical balancing.” (footnote omitted)).
120. Professor Nahmod defines categorical balancing in the following manner: “What
the Court does when it balances categorically is weigh what it considers to be the relevant
interests, social and individual, at a fairly high level of generality, and then by balancing those
interests, arrive at a generally applicable rule to be applied in later cases without further balancing.” Nahmod, supra note 118, at 570. Therefore, the Garcetti Court weighed the potential
value of speech made within the scope of employment and determined that it was unworthy of
First Amendment protection. See id. at 569–73.
121. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (“There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. . . . It has been well
observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such
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categorical balancing to restrict rather than expand the First Amendment’s
protections. For example, the Court has excluded fighting words,122 obscenity,123 and, more recently, child pornography124 from First Amendment protection. As the Court in New York v. Ferber observed, wholesale rejection of
certain kinds of speech is predicated on the notion that “within the confines
of the given classification, the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake, that no process of case-bycase adjudication is required.”125
As discussed at length above, this is simply not the case with public
employee speech law.126 Categorical balancing is inappropriate for public
employee speech because the fundamental policy rationales that underscore
the law’s treatment of obscenity, fighting words, and child pornography are
lacking in this context.
II. A Better Framework to Protect Public Employee Speech
Erwin Chemerinsky described the Supreme Court’s 2005 Term as “a
tough year for freedom of speech.”127 As the preceding Section indicated,
Garcetti’s categorical threshold was a bridge too far. A different balancing
regime would eliminate some of Garcetti’s troubling implications and also
remove a doctrinal anomaly from the body of First Amendment law. A complete return to Connick–Pickering, however, is also imprudent. Part II instead argues in favor of a tiered, balancing framework, analogous to the
process used in equal protection analysis, since such a test would more faithfully and effectively apply the First Amendment within the practical realities
of the administrative state.
This new rule would use Connick’s matter-of-public-importance inquiry
as a sorting mechanism rather than a dispositive filter. In the lowest tier,
speech that did not touch on a matter of public importance would force the
government to articulate a legitimate administrative interest for its actions.
Next, speech on matters of ordinary public importance would be subjected
to a classic Connick–Pickering test. Additionally, in the top tier, speech regarding matters of unusual public importance would force the government
to prove that its interests substantially outweigh the employee’s First
Amendment concerns.
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”).
122. Id. at 572.
123. E.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
124. 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982).
125. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763–64; accord Chaplinsky, 313 U.S. at 571–72; Roth, 354 U.S.
at 484 (“[I]mplicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as
utterly without redeeming social importance.”).
126. See supra Introduction and Section I.B.1 (describing and explaining the heightened importance and First Amendment value of government whistleblowing).
127. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Kennedy Court: October Term 2005, 9 Green Bag 2d 335,
340 (2006).
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Section II.A sets out three levels of public importance within the First
Amendment analysis. It goes on to argue that this three-tiered framework
better embodies the policies underlying the First Amendment without sacrificing the practicalities of the administrative state. Section II.B then applies
the new framework counterfactually to explain how it resolves the difficulties illuminated in Part I while remaining faithful to the relevant policy
objectives discussed throughout this Note.
A. A Tiered Framework
This Note proposes an initial, trifurcated sorting inquiry. It argues that a
three-tiered analytical framework will resolve most of the major complications that Garcetti’s categorical rule produced. Section II.A.1 asserts that
courts should initially determine into which of three categories the speech in
question falls: speech that does not touch on a matter of public concern;
speech regarding a matter of “ordinary” public concern; or speech pertaining to a matter of “substantial” public concern. Section II.A.2 contends that
applying a different level of scrutiny to each category will allow courts to
better resolve the challenges created by public employee speech. Specifically,
courts should evaluate speech that involves purely private matters under a
rational basis standard. Speech regarding matters of ordinary public concern
should be evaluated according to the Connick–Pickering framework. And
speech involving matters of substantial public concern should be presumptively protected until the government can show that it has a substantial interest that significantly outweighs the employee and the public’s interest in
the employee’s speech.
1. Three Levels of Speech
As explained in Part I, a categorical rule based on the role of the speaker
is undesirable. Instead, as earlier cases recognized, the proper emphasis is on
the public importance of the speech at issue.128 Connick recognized a dichotomy in speech: speech either touched on a matter of public concern or it did
not.129 Public importance, however, at least in the arena of public employee
speech, is not dichromatic. Some courts appear to have discerned at least
three levels of importance: (1) speech that does not touch on matters of
public concern, (2) speech that touches on matters of ordinary public concern, and (3) speech that touches on matters of substantial public concern.
This hierarchy reflects accepted echelons of importance and assists in the
administration of public employee speech cases; any rule predicated on filtering speech by its public importance should reflect this reality.

128. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).
129. Id. at 147–48. This conceptualization of speech is found in other areas of First
Amendment law, such as defamation. E.g., Miles v. Ramsey, 31 F. Supp. 2d 869, 875 (D. Colo.
1998).
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The first category of speech fails to touch on matters of public concern.
Its existence is well established.130 In essence, case law distinguishes speech
based on whether it relates to “political, social, or other concern to the community.”131 For example, purely personal concerns, such as complaining
about an employer’s internal sick leave policy132 or long hours and limited
vacation time,133 are not considered matters of public concern.
Other speech does relate to political, social, or other community concerns. As a general principle, “speech . . . concern[ing] ‘issues about which
information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society’ to
make informed decisions about the operation of their government merits
the highest degree of [F]irst [A]mendment protection.”134
Speech touching on a matter of public concern can be further subdivided based on whether the speech involves a matter of substantial or only
ordinary public concern.135 But the precise contours of this distinction are
still ill formed.136 Courts have begun to explore the differences by distinctly
classifying certain kinds of speech. For instance, at least one court has found
that the public has a substantial concern in speech discussing the compensation of public officers and the relationship between unions and elected officials.137 Likewise, racial discrimination in public schools138 and actual
wrongdoing or breach of public trust by public officials139 are considered
matters of substantial public concern. Justice Souter’s Garcetti dissent also
130. E.g., Leon Friedman, First Amendment Retaliation, in 2 Practising Law Institute, 22nd Annual Section 1983 Civil Rights Litigation 797, 810–16 (2005) (collecting
cases where courts found that the speech did not touch on matters of public concern).
131. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146.
132. Crain v. Bd. of Police Comm’rs, 920 F.2d 1402, 1411 (8th Cir. 1990).
133. Johnson v. Elizabethtown, 800 F.2d 404, 406 (4th Cir. 1986).
134. McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting Thornhill
v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940)).
135. Joseph O. Oluwole, The Pickering Balancing Test and Public Employment-Free
Speech Jurisprudence: The Approaches of Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals, 46 Duq. L. Rev. 133,
167 (2008) (differentiating matters of public concern and substantial matters of public concern); see also Hall v. Marion Sch. Dist. No. 2, 31 F.3d 183, 195 (4th Cir. 1994) (“When an
employee’s speech substantially involves matters of public concern . . . the state must make a
stronger showing of disruption in order to prevail.”). As an aside, Oluwole’s article actually
posits that three categories of speech exist: public concern, substantial public concern, and
inherent public concern. Oluwole, supra at 167. However, as he admits, the Supreme Court has
not articulated a standard for inherent matters of public concern. Id. This Note considers the
difference semantic. Both “substantial matters of public concern” and “inherent matters of
public concern” refer to speech concerning issues that are especially sensitive to the public.
Unless and until courts create a more tangible distinction between the two, it is more prudent
to simply recognize a category of speech that is extraordinarily important.
136. Indeed, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the entire realm of “public
concern” is amorphous. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1211 (2011).
137. McKinley, 705 F.2d at 1114.
138. Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 778 (4th Cir. 2004).
139. Khuans v. Sch. Dist. 110, 123 F.3d 1010, 1018 (7th Cir. 1997); see also United
States v. Richey, 924 F.2d 857, 866 (9th Cir. 2001) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (“[T]he operations of the courts and the judicial conduct of judges are matters of utmost public concern.”
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identified official dishonesty, deliberately unconstitutional action, other serious wrongdoing, and threats to health and safety as matters of unusual public concern.140 The logical extrapolation is that speech concerning either
society’s most salient issues or the fundamental integrity of government is
set apart from most statements of public interest.
This category of speech is distinct from speech of ordinary public concern. Speech can assist the public in making informed decisions of social
significance—and therefore of public concern—without touching on a matter of significant public importance. The breadth of the category that pertains to matters of ordinary public concern is undeniably broader than that
of the category in which the concern is substantial. The former category
includes employment policies restricting speech,141 public health and safety
violations at public work sites,142 written policies for police departments,143
and investigatory protocol of local police departments,144 among other types
of speech.
The case law thus demonstrates that speech has been categorized into
three distinct levels of importance. This categorization should be reflected in
a content-based analysis. A failure to do so undervalues speech that implicates the First Amendment’s core concerns but overvalues speech that, while
important, is not integral to the functioning of a democratic society. As the
previously cited cases indicate, some courts have recognized that the government has a higher burden when public-employee speech implicates matters
of substantial public concern. A formal structure would ensure that the most
important speech is given utmost protection.145 Accordingly, speech should
be filtered into three preliminary categories of public importance, and the
relevant category should dictate the ultimate burden and degree of scrutiny.
However, this Note’s test also preserves a more structured inquiry,
which should help ameliorate concerns over consistent application inherent
in unbridled balancing. Furthermore, it is unlikely that this test sacrifices
much predictability, given that the Court’s current categorical rule has

(quoting Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839 (1978)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
140. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 435 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Jefferies v. Harleston, 820 F. Supp. 741, 743 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting that courts require a more
rigorous showing by the government when “a public employee’s speech substantially involves
matters of public concern”).
141.
2007).

Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 1206 (10th Cir.

142.

Considine v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 910 F.2d 695, 700 (10th Cir. 1990).

143.

Watters v. City of Philadelphia, 55 F.3d 886, 892 (3d Cir. 1995).

144.

Gustafson v. Jones, 117 F.3d 1015, 1019 (7th Cir. 1997).

145. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011) (“[S]peech on public issues
occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is entitled to special protection.” (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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proven confusing and difficult to apply among the circuit courts.146 In essence, this Note’s proposal attempts to strike a more appropriate balance
between necessary flexibility and practical administrability.
This rule also helps harmonize public-employee speech law within First
Amendment jurisprudence. Courts, to an extent, have recognized three
levels of public importance for speech, and the proposed rule mirrors the
divisions in this area of law. By reflecting the preexisting distinctions, the
rule resolves doctrinal inconsistency—if courts recognize three levels of importance, the threshold inquiry should sort into three categories rather than
two. As a result, this Note’s proposed rule rejects Connick’s bifurcated filtering process and replaces it with trifurcated sorting.
2. Weighing the Speech’s Content
The preceding Section answers the question of why a three-tiered approach is appropriate, but it leaves open what standards and burdens courts
should apply to speech in those three tiers and why. As a general matter, it
makes sense that three categories—once distinguished on an axis of importance—should be given differing standards of protection (since Connick established that this should be the operative preliminary concern147). This
Section begins by laying out the various standards applied to speech filtered
into each category and then posits that these standards reflect the underlying
policy goals of the First Amendment.
The first kind of speech is that which does not touch on a matter of
public concern. Under Connick, courts categorically denied this speech any
protection when it was made by a public employee.148 This determination
was rooted in the Court’s belief that the fundamental concern implicated in
the arena of public employee speech was balancing the inherent tension between government offices’ paralysis if every employment decision were to
become a constitutional matter against the employees’ ability to participate
in public affairs.149 Consequently, if an employee’s speech did not address a
matter of public concern, then the First Amendment’s concerns would not
be implicated on the employee’s behalf, and there would be no colorable
claim.150 This result raises an important point: the speech increasingly implicates the First Amendment as it touches on subjects more central to the
functioning of a democratic society.151
146. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. Furthermore, “[i]f federal judges cannot
agree on the meaning and scope of the Garcetti rule . . . . it does suggest that it is not a good
doctrinal choice. Given the confusion in the circuits, Garcetti has turned out to be a bad thing
in terms of First Amendment values.” Roosevelt, supra note 30, at 648.
147. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145–46 (1983).
148. Id. at 146–47.
149. Id. at 142–49.
150. Id. at 146.
151. See id.; see also, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011).
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Under this Note’s proposal, the government would still bear the minimal burden of demonstrating that it had a legitimate and rational administrative interest justifying its conduct.152 To afford no protection to even
wholly private speech would be unwise; the First Amendment “presumptively protect[s] all speech against government interference, leaving it to the
government to demonstrate . . . [the] need to remove some speech from
protection.”153 As a methodological matter, then, it makes little sense to automatically deprive speech of protection before any countervailing interest is
even discussed. Thus, an employee’s speech would not be devoid of protection, but the government would bear a low burden to establish that its interests outweigh those of the employee. As every case has noted, the
government-employer must be able to conduct its business free from constitutional protection for each and every statement made by its employees.154
Such a standard would allow the government to continue acting as an employer while ensuring that the First Amendment is not presumptively
dismissed.
The intermediate level of scrutiny, which applies to speech on matters of
ordinary public concern, would leave the Connick–Pickering test unaltered.
As described in previous Sections, Garcetti’s categorical threshold is problematic. And, in most circumstances, the Connick–Pickering test ably balances First Amendment concerns with the needs of government entities.
This balancing is sensible for several reasons. First, it readily responds on a
case-by-case basis to the specific challenges (for both the government and
the employee).155 It also enables courts to weigh the government’s concerns,
within justifiable limitations.156 And, most importantly, it recognizes the
value of public-employee speech to the community, even when it is made
pursuant to official duties.157 In this way, courts could give due deference to
both administrative and First Amendment concerns when matters of public
concern are involved.
Only the most important and salient speech—what this Note has labeled speech on a matter of substantial public concern—would be subject to
heightened scrutiny under the three-tiered approach. Matters of substantial
152. This standard parallels, in many ways, the familiar rational basis review used
under the Fourteenth Amendment. E.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313–16
(1993). It is similar in form and rationale. Just as the Equal Protection Clause’s concerns are
less implicated by nonsuspect classifications, id. at 313, the First Amendment’s concerns are
not strongly implicated by speech involving matters of private concern, e.g., Connick, 461 U.S.
at 147.
153. United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1205 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2537
(2012); accord 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621, 636 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v.
Perelman, 658 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 2011), amended by 695 F.3d 866 (9th Cir. 2012).
154. See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006) (“Government employers,
like private employers, need a significant degree of control over their employees’ words and
actions; without it, there would be little chance for the efficient provision of public services.”).
155.

Norcross, supra note 13, at 572.

156. Id.
157. See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004).
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public concern would receive the most stringent First Amendment protections.158 In these circumstances, the government would carry a higher burden: its interests must substantially outweigh both the public and private
interests in free speech.
In areas of particularly important speech, administrative interests
should not overcome the employee’s First Amendment protection—that
“eternal bulwark against tyranny and dictatorship”159—except in the rarest
of circumstances and for the weightiest of societal considerations.160 This
resembles the Equal Protection Clause’s strict scrutiny standard.161 Strict
scrutiny is invoked in equal protection analysis “[i]f the disputed classification affects a fundamental right or is an inherently suspicious classification.”162 Likewise, when the First Amendment’s core concerns are involved,
courts should immediately be cautious of the government’s attempt to restrict or suppress the speech. This standard intentionally tips the balance in
favor of the employee’s speech, which is particularly appropriate because
when “balancing competing interests, it is scarcely surprising that reasonable
persons will disagree with the ultimate balance struck in specific cases.”163 In
cases involving the core concerns of free speech, the First Amendment
should be less flexible.164 Thus, the standard is tilted toward the employee
unless and until the government proffers exceptional circumstances that justify overriding the presumption in favor of freedom of speech.
Public sector whistleblowers do not fall into this realm of heightened
scrutiny per se;165 courts must first assess the content of the speech itself.
However, whistleblowers, by definition, expose governmental misfeasance or
158. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011).
159. Herbert Brownell Jr., Freedom and Responsibility of the Press in a Free Country, 24
Fordham L. Rev. 178, 178 (1955).
160. See Rosalie Berger Levinson, Silencing Government Employee Whistleblowers in the
Name of “Efficiency”, 23 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 17, 21 (1996) (arguing that whistleblowing speech
“[b]y definition . . . should not be chilled ‘in the name of efficiency’ ” (quoting Waters v.
Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1888 (1994))).
161. Strict scrutiny requires that the government show that its act was narrowly tailored
to address a compelling interest. E.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227
(1995). Similarly, to significantly exceed the importance of a substantial matter of public concern, the government would need to proffer a truly compelling interest that animated its
decision.
162.

Student Doe v. Pennsylvania, 593 F. Supp. 54, 57 (E.D. Pa. 1984).

163. Rodric B. Schoen, Pickering Plus Thirty Years: Public Employees and Free Speech, 30
Tex. Tech L. Rev. 5, 30 (1999).
164. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983). And judicial intervention is particularly appropriate when the First Amendment’s protection of free expression is at issue.
Vanasco v. Schwartz, 401 F. Supp. 87, 99 (E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff’d, 423 U.S. 1041
(1976).
165. To do so would be equivalent to assigning a level of protection to speech based on
the speaker’s role (a “whistleblower”) rather than assessing the speech’s importance in its own
right. This is one of the very follies that has rendered Garcetti so untenable. See supra notes
61–65, 85–87, and accompanying text.
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nonfeasance.166 Since governmental inefficiency and wrongdoing are matters
of public concern,167 it would seem that whistleblowers almost always speak
on at least a matter of ordinary public concern. Whether the speech implicated matters of substantial public importance would depend on the specific
facts of the case.168
The result would be that courts must first determine into which of the
three categories of public concern the speech falls. In doing so, courts ask
whether the speech concerns “ ‘issues about which information is needed or
appropriate to enable the members of society’ to make informed decisions
about the operation of their government [because such speech] merits the
highest degree of [F]irst [A]mendment protection.”169 After sorting, the government would need to proffer a legitimate administrative rationale if the
speech did not involve matters of public importance; sufficient justification
that outweighed the employee’s First Amendment interests if it did touch
upon a matter of ordinary public concern; and significant governmental
concerns that substantially outweighed the citizen’s First Amendment protection if it involved a matter of substantial public concern. This framework
would ensure that the government can function correctly while still protecting one of the most fundamental rights afforded American citizens.
B. The Framework Applied: Resolving Garcetti’s Practical Difficulties
The tripartite framework that this Note proposes resolves many of the
quandaries produced by Garcetti. This Section applies the framework to scenarios involving public-employee speech and suggests that it would produce
results more in line with First Amendment doctrine and policy objectives.
An apt starting point is the difficulty presented by Bowie and Jackler. In
Jackler, the officer refused to withdraw his statement on severe police
misconduct (excessive force),170 and the inspector in Bowie did the same

166. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
167.

Alpha Energy Savers, Inc. v. Hansen, 381 F.3d 917, 926 (9th Cir. 2004).

168. For example, statements of a state’s lieutenant governor that expose widespread
election fraud and bribery committed by the governor’s office would undoubtedly be matters
of substantial public concern, given that they expose serious breaches of the public’s trust,
corruption, and crime. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 435 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) (characterizing “official dishonesty, deliberately unconstitutional action, [and] other serious wrongdoing” as “matters of unusual importance”). However, if the same lieutenant
governor notified a state advocacy group that the governor’s office was unnecessarily spending
lavishly on travel for its members, the speech would likely touch only on matters of ordinary
public concern since it predominantly pertained to inefficiency and wastefulness (but failed to
fundamentally undermine governmental integrity). See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
This distinction is further explored infra in Section II.B.
169. McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting Thornhill
v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940)).
170.
(2012).

Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 231 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1634
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with his statement on alleged racial discrimination in the workplace.171
Under the tripartite framework, the first step would be to determine the
importance of the speech at issue. A hypothetical Bowie court would likely
categorize the speech—raising concerns of racial discrimination in a public
office—as involving a matter of substantial public concern.172 Likewise, a
court would likely conclude that Jackler’s report of coerced fraud by the
police was also exceptionally important.173
As a result, the government would be required to demonstrate that it
had significant interests that substantially outweighed the employee’s First
Amendment protections. Almost undoubtedly, the government would not
be able to carry its burden because “[i]t would be inappropriate for the
department to seek to conceal such claims, or to require [the individual] to
withdraw a truthful claim, or to seek to conceal a witnessing officer’s corroboration of the events alleged in such a claim.”174 Such actions would not
sufficiently advance proper performance of governmental functions so as to
significantly outweigh (or outweigh at all) the employee’s substantial First
Amendment’s concerns.175
As a preliminary matter, this result is sound. It would protect
whistleblowers, who serve important functions in contributing to public discourse and promoting government efficiency and fidelity, against retaliatory
employment action. The government would face a steep burden, which
would ensure that this speech would be protected except in exceptional cases
where the government possessed countervailing interests of remarkable importance, such as national security.176
The most important facet of this analysis, however, is not what a court
would do but what a court would not do. A court would not be forced to
engage in a scope-of-employment inquiry that forces it to categorically deny
protection to an employee, no matter how valuable his speech was, if the
statement were made pursuant to official duties. This would allow the court
171. Bowie v. Maddox, 642 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
1636 (2012).
172. See Levinson, supra note 160, at 63–66 (arguing that whistleblowing speech, generally, should be afforded stringent protection); cf. Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 778 (4th
Cir. 2004) (finding that racial discrimination in public schools was of significant public
concern).
173. See Jackler, 658 F.3d at 236 (“Exposure of official misconduct, especially within the
police department, is generally of great consequence to the public.” (quoting Branton v. City
of Dallas, 272 F.3d 730, 740 (5th Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. United
States v. Smith, 123 F.3d 140, 150 (3d Cir. 1997) (positing that it is of “significant public
interest” to investigate allegations of “government misconduct” in a case where newspapers
sought access to certain court records).
174. Jackler, 658 F.3d at 242.
175. Id.
176. National security is used as an example because it has long been held to be one of
the government’s most compelling interests, e.g., United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir.
2008), aff’d, 285 F. App’x 784 (2d Cir. 2008); Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, 847 F.2d 502, 509
n.9 (9th Cir. 1988), but it is by no means the only sufficient interest.
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to directly respond to the relevant interests177 instead of being forced to ignore them on a threshold determination that has no bearing on the value of
the speech. It would not deter the employee from voicing his concern
through the appropriate, efficient internal channels. And it would not reward a government employer for manipulating an employee’s official duties
against him. Thus, this analysis would ensure that the First Amendment is
always considered before its concerns are dismissed and that employers, as
well as employees, are not incentivized to undercut the administrative interests that Garcetti sought to protect.
Additionally, this Note’s framework provides a satisfactory answer to
the scenario that the Garcetti majority posed, in which a public employee
writes a nondisruptive memorandum littered with errors but that addresses
an issue of ordinary public concern.178 The concern is that the employer will
be unable to terminate the employee for his sub-par work product.179 However, this scenario is deceptively easy. This Note’s scheme would quickly dispose of the employee’s claim. The Court has repeatedly held that erroneous
statements frustrate First Amendment values.180 Accordingly, courts would
assign very little value to an employee’s speech that is riddled with misstatements and mistakes. But, on the other side of the balancing test applied to
this category of speech, the government would have a great interest in ensuring that its employees produced high-quality, accurate work product. As
such, the government would often have little difficulty defending an adverse
employment action on that basis.
Lastly, the Garcetti Court, in part, created the categorical scope-of-employment rule to ensure that some speech would not be subject to constitutional protection and, therefore, potential litigation.181 This “floodgates” fear
is dubious since Connick–Pickering itself did not create an excessive
caseload.182 Furthermore, while this new framework would expand constitutional protections—even to matters that do not implicate public concern—
the government’s burden would remain minimal in certain cases. Indeed, it
should not cost the government excessive effort to articulate a legitimate
administrative rationale.183 The fear of floodgates is overrated.
177. See supra Section I.C.
178. E.g., Roosevelt, supra note 30, at 652. Specifically, Roosevelt suggested that Richard
Ceballos’s memo, which his superiors ultimately determined to have reached the incorrect
conclusion, was an exemplar of a memo addressing a matter of public concern and was
nondisruptive but riddled with errors that presented a circumstance the Connick–Pickering test
was ill-equipped to dispose of. Id.
179. Id.
180. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 767 (1985); see
also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (“[T]here is no constitutional value
in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances
society’s interest in ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate on public issues.” (quoting
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964))).
181. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 420–21, 423 (2006).
182. Id. at 435 (Souter, J., dissenting).
183. See, e.g., Walker v. Bain, 257 F.3d 660, 668 (6th Cir. 2001).
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The folly of this concern is illustrated by the following example: A public employee discuses wholly personal matters with a group of coworkers;
the gossip, naturally, distracts other employees from their work for a considerable amount of time. The employee is subsequently terminated. In the
ensuing suit, a court would sort this type of speech into the least protected
category (since the matter does not concern anything of public importance);
the employer would only need to articulate a legitimate basis to satisfy the
standard. For example, the employer could easily show that the speech distracted employees from their work, which led to inefficiency in the workplace. Employees, consequently, would not be incentivized to bring frivolous
suits, and employers would not be required to expend significant resources
defending a multitude of suits based on relatively unimportant speech. Conversely, any costs that Garcetti would save come at too high a price: valuable
First Amendment protection.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti has spawned a number of
problems. As evidenced by Jackler and Bowie, lower courts continue to work
out these difficulties. This Note proposes a new, tripartite framework that
would abandon Garcetti’s threshold requirement that an employee not speak
pursuant to official duties; instead, a court would initially sort the speech
into one of three tiers based on the public interest involved. A court would
accomplish this sorting by determining to what degree the speech is needed
or appropriate to enable the general public to make informed decisions
about the operation of its government. After sorting, the government would
need to proffer a legitimate administrative rationale if the speech did not
involve matters of public importance; sufficient justification that outweighed
the employee’s First Amendment interests if it did touch upon a matter of
ordinary public concern; and significant governmental concerns that substantially outweighed the citizen’s First Amendment protection if it involved
a matter of substantial public concern.
This framework is a reaction to the Supreme Court’s misguided decision
in Garcetti, which forces public employees and courts to choose between
undesirable and inescapable alternatives, creates perverse incentives for employers and employees alike, and is out of step with First Amendment doctrine. Instead, this Note’s framework reprioritizes the protection of speech,
regardless of the speaker’s role. It rejects categorical dismissal of certain
speech and ensures that contributions to the marketplace of ideas are afforded adequate protection.

